IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No.
05-441-JJF

v.

INTEL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Teleconference in above matter taken pursuant to notice before Renee A. Meyers, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public, in the offices of Blank Rome, LLP, 1201 North Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware, on Wednesday, August 22, 2007, beginning at approximately 4:00 p.m., there being present:

BEFORE:

THE HONOROABLE VINCENT J. POPPITI, SPECIAL MASTER APPEARANCES:

POTTER, ANDERSON & CORROON RICHARD L. HORWITZ, ESQ. W. HARDING DRANE, ESQ.W 1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor Wilmington, DE 19899 for Intel

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Page 3
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Counsel, Vincent
 1
     Poppiti. How are you all?
 2
                MR. HOLZMAN: James Holzman, Prickett Jones
 3
     for the Class.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you.
 5
                 MR. SMALL: Daniel Small with Cohen Milstein
 6
     for the Class.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you.
 8
                 MR. LANDAU: Brent Landau with Cohen
     Milstein for the Class.
10
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you.
11
12
                 MR. HORWITZ: Rich Horwitz and Harding Drane
     for Intel, and with Your Honor's permission, I may be
13
     getting off the call before we are done, depending on
14
     how long it goes, but Mr. Drane and my co-counsel will
15
16
     still be on.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: That's fine.
                                                        Thank
17
18
     you.
                 MR. HORWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
                 MR. HOCKETT: Chris and Bri Hahn (phonetic)
20
     for Intel.
21
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you very
22
23
     much.
                 MS. MULLANEY: Mary Mullaney from Blank
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Page 4 1 Rome. 2 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you. I think 3 that rounds us out. The application that is before me I have as DM No. 7. It is Intel's application to tell Class plaintiffs to produce documents responsive to document request for production No. 8 and 9. And although the 7 original pleading was for eight, nine, as well as first set of request for production and request for production 10 Nos. 1 and 2, I think that's changed during the course 11 of your meet and confers and/or during the course of 12 your submittals to me. I have read the July 31st application. 13 I 14 have also read the answering document filed in opposition dated August 7 and the reply dated August 9. 15 16 So, please. 17 MR. HOCKETT: Chris Hockett. If you would like me to start, I am prepared to do that. 18 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Please do. 19 20 MR. HOCKETT: Thank you. Thanks for hearing We are actually before Your Honor on four requests. 21 22 They are requests 8 and 9 and the first set of request for production and request one and two in the second set 23 24 of requests for production. Request 1 and 2 from the

- 1 second set encompass 8 and 9.
- 2 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay
- 3 MR. HOCKETT: And I think this boils down to
- 4 really just one question, and, that is, whether the
- 5 ML Lee case decided by Judge Farnan applies here. If it
- 6 does, I don't think it leaves much question that we are
- 7 entitled to the discovery that we seek. But if it does
- 8 apply because it is relevant to the adequacy of the
- 9 plaintiffs to represent the Class, as Judge Farnan said
- in ML Lee -- and this is on page 508.
- 11 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I have that in
- 12 front of me.
- 13 MR. HOCKETT: Before allowing a plaintiff to
- 14 represent the Class, the Court must be convinced that
- the plaintiffs are willing and financially able to
- 16 shoulder the burdens of Class representation; thus, the
- 17 financial status of a proposed representative plaintiff
- 18 is relevant to the determination of whether that
- 19 plaintiff is capable of adequately representing the
- 20 Class, closed quote.
- 21 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And, counsel, if I
- 22 understand the Class -- and I want you to frame your
- 23 comments essentially based on their discussion with you
- 24 in their answer -- if I understand it, and if I

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Page 6
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     overstate it, I am sure I will be told that perhaps I am
     -- are you all there?
                 MR. HOCKETT: Yes, Your Honor.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: It seems to me what
     they are saying is, as a result of the changes to the
     rules, that, in certain context, I am not sure what
     context we are dealing with here yet, it is
     inappropriate for the Court to consider the financial
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 9
     wherewithal of the Class representatives.
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                 Do you agree with that, their view of what
11
     they are saying?
12
                 MR. HOCKETT: If you put it that way, I
13
     think I agree that they say we are not entitled to this
     discovery, and they have -- the plaintiffs have cited
14
15
     two cases which come out the other way from ML Lee and
16
     Judge Farnan.
17
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right.
18
                 MR. HOCKETT: And we certainly acknowledge
     that there is a split of authority on this issue. There
19
20
     is a split before Judge Farnan decided the ML Lee case
     and actually another case where he came out the same
21
22
     way.
23
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI:
                                          Right.
24
                 MR. HOCKETT: And there is a split of
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- 1 authority after.
- 2 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: It's both before
- 3 and after, I agree.
- 4 MR. HOCKETT: And there was a split -- there
- 5 are cases, and we have cited at least one to Your Honor
- 6 after the adoption of Rule 23(g), which acknowledged
- 7 that a Class representative's financial information is
- 8 relevant to the adequacy determination. The case I am
- 9 thinking of is called Mascol versus E & L
- 10 Transportation.
- So, the defenses that the plaintiffs have
- 12 raised to this discovery are two: One is that they have
- 13 a fee agreement which renders the plaintiffs'
- 14 wherewithal irrelevant; however, Judge Farnan, himself,
- in ML Lee, dealt with that, and I am sure Your Honor has
- 16 read that --
- 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I have.
- 18 MR. HOCKETT: -- and discussed it.
- 19 The other defense they have is that
- 20 Rule 23(g)'s adoption in 2003 does away with this issue,
- 21 but we say that isn't so.
- 22 Rule 23(g) --
- 23 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Talk about the
- 24 first piece of that with respect to the fee arrangement.

Page 8 If I understand the state of this record, 1 you have a representation that there is a fee arrangement. We don't know what that is. We don't know what the binding number is and we don't know whether there are any provisions for letting anyone out; correct? MR. HOCKETT: That's correct. Similar to ML 8 Lee, the plaintiffs haven't completely disclosed the fee 9 arrangement, but they have talked about it in hypothetical terms. And as ML Lee says, an agreement by 10 plaintiffs' counsel to advance the cost of litigation 11 does not defeat the relevance of plaintiff's own 12 financial status. 13 So, we don't know what their agreement is. 14 But even if it is what they have hinted at, that's the 1.5 same thing that Judge Farnan addressed in ML Lee. 16 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. MR. HOCKETT: And then with regard to the 18 arguments related to the adoption of Rule 23(g), 23(g) 19 is, by its terms, explicitly addressed to how courts 20 21 should evaluate the adequacy of Class counsel. It left intact 23(a), which still requires the Court to consider 22 23 the adequacy of Class representative. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right. No language 24

- 1 was changed.
- 2 MR. HOCKETT: That was not changed and the
- 3 comments underscore that. I am reading the comments in
- 4 subdivision "G" that came out with the new rule.
- 5 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I have that right
- 6 in front of me.
- 7 MR. HOCKETT: It says, "Rule 23(a)(4) will
- 8 continue to call for scrutiny of the proposed Class
- 9 representative while this subdivision will guide the
- 10 Court in assessing proposed Class counsel as part of the
- 11 certification decision."
- So, that, by its terms, was not intended to
- 13 affect anything related to the analysis of the adequacy
- 14 of Class representatives to serve as Class
- 15 representatives, and, thus, we don't think would
- 16 "implyedly" revoke or undermine the body of case law, of
- 17 which ML Lee is a part, that says that financial
- 18 information of plaintiffs is relevant to that
- 19 determination.
- 20 As I said, there was a split of authority
- 21 before and there is a split of authority after ML Lee
- 22 and after the adoption of Rule 23(g). I have no reason
- 23 to believe that Judge Farnan has changed his mind on
- 24 this, and, in fact, I have every reason to believe that

Page 10 he, based on what he says in ML Lee, that he will expect to hear testimony on this issue in connection with Class certification. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And let me ask another question with respect to your view of the split of authority, and whether you choose to do it globally 6 in terms of answering or helping with the question or 8 whether you choose to focus on any particular case, it's your choice, but I certainly have the sense that, with 10 respect to the cases that you -- which you each have brought to my attention, they are rather fact driven. A 11 12 number of them that went the other way, that did not 13 accept the Farnan view, either pre or post Farnan, were 14 looking at different classes, if you will. Some were 15 looking at classes that were not as significant as the Class that is described in this case. 16 Do you agree that that's a fair statement? 17 MR. HOCKETT: This is Chris Hockett. I do 18 There are a couple of different variations. 19 20 of the variations relates to the complexity of the case 21 and the size of the alleged Class. And a number of the 22 decisions that have come out, as you put it, in a way 23 opposite of ML Lee, have cited the small size of the

Class that was involved in this case and the relatively

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- 1 un-complex nature of those cases to say that the
- 2 plaintiffs' wherewithal wasn't relevant.
- 3 A number of those cases have distinguished
- 4 the cases that have held that the financial information
- 5 of plaintiffs was relevant by saying, Those were cases
- 6 that involved a large number of alleged Class members
- 7 and complex claims.
- 8 Here, we have a case that where the alleged
- 9 Class would number in the millions of people. It's a
- 10 complex case. The class of notification and other costs
- 11 would be enormous. So, I would say that a number of the
- 12 cases, for example, the Sanderson versus Winner case in
- 13 the Tenth Circuit would have come out our way because of
- 14 what they say about the applicabilities of their ruling
- 15 only through cases that are much more -- much smaller in
- 16 nature and scope.
- 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And I think it's
- 18 not inappropriate to suggest I believe you are looking
- 19 at language, and let me quote this for the record, and
- 20 this is from Sanderson case, at page 480, "We are aware
- 21 that some lower Court decisions have considered the
- 22 plaintiffs' ability to pay as relevant and proper in the
- 23 present context." And then it goes on to cite several
- 24 cases. "However, in both of these cases in which

- 1 antitrust violations were alleged, the plaintiff sought
- 2 to represent a Class of all new car purchasers in the
- 3 United States, thus, there was legitimate concern about
- 4 the ability of plaintiffs to successfully lead a Class
- 5 of this magnitude."
- Also, the Court, and it references a case in
- 7 Ralston, was concerned about its ability to manage the
- 8 Class. The mentioned considerations are not present
- 9 here.
- 10 MR. HOCKETT: The only other thing I would
- 11 add -- and this is Chris Hockett again -- the only other
- 12 thing I would add is that there are a number of
- 13 decisions that take up the issue of the plaintiffs'
- 14 wherewithal in the context of Class certification and
- 15 they say that it's not determinative, and we think that
- 16 is quite a separate issue from whether the financial
- 17 status and facts related to the Class representatives is
- 18 discoverable.
- 19 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Well, and I -- let
- 20 me ask you, in that context, then, I was struck by the
- 21 reference to -- let me just pull this case for a moment
- 22 -- Weikel, and let me read the context in the Class
- 23 submission. It's a reference to Weikel and the
- 24 parenthetical is distinguishing ML Lee and concluding

- 1 that there were a bit there -- I am sorry -- and
- 2 concluding that where a plaintiff, quote, has no
- 3 obligation to pay the expenses of litigation regardless
- 4 of the outcome -- and I am going to want you to address
- 5 that in a moment -- "there is no possibility the threat
- 6 of funding revocation will lead to coercion."
- 7 I guess what I found interesting, and I will
- 8 want both of you to address this, if you choose, in
- 9 Weikel, as I read it, I understood that there was a
- 10 question about the ability of individual members of the
- 11 Class to be members of the Class, that one individual
- 12 member, and I believe that member's name, and I am
- 13 looking at page 399 of the case, was an individual by
- 14 the name of Lyons, and the Court said, "Defendants argue
- 15 the fact Lyons did not wish to bear the burden of
- 16 proceeding at his own at a cost of approximately \$5,000
- 17 demonstrates he is not suitable to be a Class
- 18 representative."
- 19 And then the Court goes on to point out that
- 20 the facts that it was dealing with, in this case -- and
- 21 I might add that this was on the merits of
- 22 certification, it wasn't a discovery -- it was not a
- 23 discovery case -- the Court pointed out that there were
- 24 two things that it considered in terms of the factual

Page 14 context. One was the plaintiffs, counsel for lead plaintiffs agreed to advance the costs of suit, and perhaps even more importantly, it goes on to read, "In the event this action is not successful, Workman," who happens to be another named Class plaintiff -- "has agreed to reimburse counsel for litigation expenses and have proffered evidence of their ability to do so." So, it seems to me the Court was saying there are a couple factors here, both of which related 9 10 to, or a number of them, each of them related to 11 finances. One, it said there was a funding agreement; two, even if the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, one of 12 the members of the Class said, "We will do it," and, 13 finally, the member of the Class that said, "We will do 14 it," the Court had some information that there was 15 evidence of its ability to do so. 16 17 What do you make of all that? MR. HOCKETT: I think the same that you are 18 making of that, which is that there was discovery into 19 20 the finances of all of the Class representatives, or would be Class representatives so that this 21 determination could be made and it could be explored in 22 the context of the adequacy determination in connection 23 24 with Class certification proceeding.

- 1 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: One thing I'd like
- 2 you to address is the view of the Class that, by virtue
- 3 of adding focus on the Class counsel at 23(g)(1)(b),
- 4 that it really changed -- it changed the ball game, if
- 5 you will, and I am specifically referencing their
- 6 comments in your August 7th correspondence to me at page
- 7 3, where they seem to be suggesting that the function
- 8 and role of the Class representatives and the function
- 9 and role of the Class counsel has changed by virtue of
- 10 the rule change. And they describe that change rather
- 11 specifically.
- 12 I'd like you to address what you believe to
- 13 be the change that was made by the rules and its impact.
- 14 MR. HOCKETT: I think the rules, if I am not
- 15 mistaken, I think these rules were adopted in connection
- 16 with some innovations that Courts were coming up with in
- 17 terms of judging the adequacy of Class counsel and
- 18 making sure that they were adhering to their
- 19 responsibilities and not just acting with a small group
- 20 of interests and certainly not with their -- with
- 21 self-interest in mind. And this was not really
- 22 addressed to the issue of the adequacy of Class
- 23 representatives and the duties that they must bear in
- 24 connection with serving as Class representatives.

Page 16 I think it proves too much to say that it 1 doesn't matter what, after Rule 23(g), whether there 2 would be any tension or disagreement between Class counsel and the Class representatives because the Class representatives are going to look out for the interests of the Class. I think the Class representatives have, 8 since the rule was adopted originally, and continue to have duties to represent the Class, and it would be 10 improper to suggest that the relationship between them and Class counsel is now somehow made moot by 23(g). 11 12 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Would you address for me the nature -- and we don't know what the 13 agreement is -- but address with me, from your view, 14 15 what you expect an agreement to fund costs can do just 16 generically and what it can't do. MR. HOCKETT: Well, I think we submitted 17 some authority on that. 18 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: You did. 19 20 MR. HOCKETT: Some of the Class -- counsel 21 cannot agree to advance on a nonrecourse basis, if you 22 will, certain kinds of costs in connection with -- in 23 connection with their representation of a client. And 24 we gave you an opinion from I believe the Oklahoma --

- 1 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: You did.
- 2 MR. HOCKETT: -- Bar that specify the kinds
- 3 that they couldn't agree to cover without recourse.
- There are limits on their ability to stand
- 5 in front of the cost burden that would ordinarily be
- 6 borne by the real plaintiff.
- 7 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Anything
- 8 else, then, please?
- 9 MR. HOCKETT: If Your Honor doesn't have
- 10 anymore questions for us, I am prepared to pass the mic
- 11 for now.
- 12 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I have none at this
- 13 juncture.
- 14 MR. LANDAU: Good afternoon, Your Honor,
- 15 this is Brent Landau for the plaintiff.
- 16 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thanks, Mr. Landau.
- MR. LANDAU: I'd like to start by just
- 18 talking a little bit about what is the information
- 19 that's being requested here by Intel. And the key, I
- 20 think, is that the information requested is of a highly
- 21 sensitive character. It includes individual consumers'
- 22 tax returns and bank records, all of which is
- 23 information that the plaintiffs here have a very strong
- 24 interest in keeping private -- the plaintiff have a

Page 18 strong interest in keeping this type of personal 1 financial information private. And, in fact, courts 2 have recognized, and we have cited some of these in our letter brief, that allowing this type of discovery, which can be characterized, and has been, as oppressive, 5 can be used as a way for defendants in Class actions to 6 discourage meritorious suit. And I think that that's a 7 8 real concern here. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And let me ask you 10 that against the backdrop of what Judge Farnan did. Do you see, on the face of this opinion, 11 that the records that he permitted, that were required 12 to be produced in his case are different from, 13 significantly different from, not different at all from 14 what's being requested here? You agree with me he did 15 not talk about any heightened standard, did he? 16 MR. LANDAU: No. He didn't talk about a 17 heightened standard, that's true. And I think that it's 18 also true that there was some expansive information 19 ordered to be produced in that case. 20 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: So, with respect to 21 the type of information, how is Judge Farnan and ML Lee 22 different from the current circumstance? 23 24 MR. LANDAU: I am not sure that, with

- 1 respect to the type of information, it's all that very
- 2 different. But I think the effect is still important to
- 3 consider in light of the type of information that it is
- 4 and the effect that allowing this type of discovery in a
- 5 case like this one, with individual consumers, could
- 6 have.
- But I think that, against that backdrop, the
- 8 critical issue --
- 9 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Counsel, let me
- 10 just ask one other question in that vein: Is it fair to
- 11 suggest that the Class is, in this case, is significant?
- MR. LANDAU: When you say "significant," in
- 13 terms of numbers, it certainly is, or could be
- 14 significant number of consumers. The Class, as it's
- 15 been defined, would include all indirect purchasers of
- 16 Intel X 86 microprocessors.
- 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And, I mean, is it
- 18 also fair for me to expect that you are saying, if
- 19 financial information is going to be produced, it's
- 20 going to shield certain individual from wanting to
- 21 become a member of the representative Class? Is that
- 22 what I am hearing you say?
- 23 MR. LANDAU: I think it's certainly a
- 24 concern. It's a concern, for example, that the Tenth

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     Circuit pointed out in the Sanderson case.
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                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I am aware of what
     Sanderson said.
                 MR. LANDAU: So I think it's certainly a
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     risk that this type of discovery could chill
     participation in meritorious type action.
 6
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Let me ask you
     about Sanderson just for a moment because, isn't it fair
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 9
     to say that, with the Court in Sanderson expressing a
10
     concern, that the Court in Sanderson was looking at a
     limited Class, was it not?
11
                 MR. LANDAU: A Class smaller than this one,
12
13
     you mean?
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes.
14
15
                 MR. LANDAU: Yes, I think that that's true.
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                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Much smaller?
17
                 MR. LANDAU: Yes.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I don't think that
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     Sanderson said it this way, but Sanderson, do you think
19
     it stands for the proposition that if tax returns were
20
     going to be required and other financial information was
21
22
     going to be required, there would be no significant body
     called the representative Class members?
23
                 MR. LANDAU: I am not sure about that.
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- 1 didn't read it that way. And I think that the concern
- 2 that the Court in Sanderson is pointing out about
- 3 oppressive discovery as a means of discouraging private
- 4 antitrust actions is one that applies regardless of the
- 5 size of the case.
- The discussion about the size occurred in
- 7 the context of distinguishing some other cases that had
- 8 been larger than Sanderson was, but I don't think that
- 9 the size of the proposed Class is something that factors
- 10 into whether a need to produce the kinds of sensitive
- 11 financial documents that are being sought here would
- 12 discourage participation.
- 13 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. And, in any
- 14 event, Sanderson, the Sanderson decision was handed down
- 15 in 1974.
- MR. LANDAU: Yes.
- 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Long before Judge
- 18 Farnan did what he did in ML Lee.
- MR. LANDAU: That's true.
- 20 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you.
- 21 MR. LANDAU: But like ML Lee, it was before
- 22 the 2003 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
- 23 Procedure.
- 24 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I understand that

Page 22 and I expect you will want to spend some time with me discussing that. 2 3 MR. LANDAU: Well, I think that this is probably an appropriate time to do so. 4 5 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. MR. LANDAU: I think that that's really a 6 critical issue with respect to a proper interpretation 7 8 of what ML Lee means for this issue. 0 The concern, as Your Honor knows, in ML Lee, was that the plaintiff could be coerced into complying 10 with an attorney's advice with regard to different 11 options that may be available on legal issues because of 12 the potential threat of funding revocation. And what we 13 have argued is that in Rule 23(g) clarifies that that's 14 not something that would be of concern. 15 16 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Let me ask you 17 this: If I understand the comments to the Rule, and I am looking at subdivision G. 18 MR. LANDAU: Yes. 19 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: It says, 20 21 "Subdivision G is new, it responds to the reality that the selection and activity of Class counsel are often 22 23 critically important to the successful handling of a

24

Class action." And I don't think anybody that we are --

- 1 anybody this afternoon, on this call, or anyone else,
- 2 would disagree with that.
- 3 "Until now, Courts have scrutinized proposed
- 4 Class counsel as well as the Class representative under
- 5 Rule 23(a)(4). This experience has recognized the
- 6 importance of judicial evaluation of the proposed lawyer
- 7 for the Class, and this new subdivision builds on that
- 8 experience rather than introducing an entirely new
- 9 element into the Class certification process. Rule
- 10 34(a)(4) will continue to call for scrutiny of the
- 11 proposed Class representative, while this subdivision
- 12 will guide the Court in assessing proposed Class counsel
- 13 as part of the certification decision."
- 14 Now, it seems to me that what I think I am
- 15 reading here is that this is, if you will, codifying the
- 16 practice and perhaps giving more specific guidance to
- 17 the Court in some of the subsections of G(1) and (2).
- Do you disagree with that?
- 19 MR. LANDAU: I think -- I am not sure, Your
- 20 Honor, with all due respect, that I totally agree with
- 21 that.
- 22 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Well, then, please,
- 23 tell me where you don't agree.
- 24 MR. LANDAU: I think that, as a starting

Page 24 point, the addition of Rule 23(g) has to have meant something in the context of Class action procedures. 2 3 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. MR. LANDAU: And, at a minimum, I think what 4 5 it's doing is clarifying what the rules mean specifically with respect to the role of Class counsel 6 as well as the relationship between Class counsel and 7 Class representative. And some of that is especially 8 evident later in the comments with respect to the comments for paragraph (q)(1)(b), which discusses the 10 11 fact that the primary responsibility of Class counsel 12 resulting from appointment of Class counsel is to represent the best interests of the Class. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And I see that. 15 What do you make of the language in that same subsection, "The rule thus establishes the obligation of 16 Class counsel, an obligation that may be different from 17 18 the customary obligation of counsel to individual 19 client"? 20 With such compelling language in other sentences, why do you expect that the committee chose 21 22 the word "may"? Is this really a rewriting of how attorneys 23 24 relate to their clients and clients to their attorneys

- 1 in a Class setting?
- MR. LANDAU: I am not sure, Your Honor, that
- 3 it's a rewriting as much as a clarification. But with
- 4 respect to the use of the word "may," I, obviously,
- 5 don't know what the authors were thinking, but it seems
- 6 to me that that's an appropriate word in the context
- 7 because, ordinarily, there shouldn't be any divergence
- 8 in the interests of an individual Class member and the
- 9 Class as a whole.
- 10 What this comment clarifies is that when
- 11 there is any disagreement, that that obligation of Class
- 12 counsel is to the Class as a whole not to an individual
- 13 client, which is different than the customer obligations
- 14 of counsel, which, of course, are to do as the client
- 15 directs.
- 16 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And, of course,
- 17 this is all under the umbrella, or could be under the
- 18 umbrella of the watchful eye of the Court in the sense
- 19 that if there is a disagreement between, let's say, a
- 20 number of the representatives of the Class, let's not
- 21 worry about whether it's a significant number or a
- 22 number short of being significant, and the counsel for
- 23 the Class, do you not agree that, in an appropriate
- 24 setting with appropriate facts to tee it up, the Court

Page 26 may have to get involved even in that preliminary 1 2 dispute? 3 MR. LANDAU: I think, Your Honor, that it's 4 absolutely true that the Court always retains oversight 5 over what Class counsel does --SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okav. 7 MR. LANDAU: -- as pursuant to the Rule and pursuant to its inherent authority. In addition, there 8 9 were various procedural mechanisms throughout the case 10 to make that happen; for example, any member of a Class, 11 including a Class representative, always has the option to opt out of a Class or to air different views 12 regarding a settlement or other issues that may come up 13 14 in a case. 15 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right. Let me pose 16 this question: I think the Rule deals with part of the 17 coin but perhaps not with the flip side of the coin or the commentary to the rule. The commentary to the rule 18 says, in the same vein, "The Class representatives 19 20 cannot command Class counsel to accept or reject a 21 settlement proposal" -- let me qo one sentence before 22 that. "The Class representatives do not have an 23 unfettered right to fire Class counsel." 24 That, of course, is no different than it was

- 1 before this Rule was changed; is that a fair comment?
- 2 MR. LANDAU: I think that it's true that,
- 3 before the Rule was changed, the client didn't have that
- 4 unfettered right either, but I think that what this Rule
- 5 amendment does is make that clear, and, to the extent it
- 6 wasn't before, make it mandatory.
- 7 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay
- 8 MR. LANDAU: And I think, in particular,
- 9 it's worthwhile looking at what Judge Farnan was
- 10 concerned about in ML Lee, and that was that a plaintiff
- 11 could be coerced into complying with an attorney's
- 12 advice with regard to different options that may be
- 13 available.
- One example of that, and that's the example
- in the comment to which you just referred, is if there
- 16 were a proposed settlement, the Rule makes clear that
- 17 the Class representatives cannot command Class counsel
- 18 to accept or reject a settlement proposal. To the
- 19 contrary, Class counsel must determine whether seeking
- 20 the Court's approval of the settlement would be in the
- 21 best interests of the Class as a whole.
- 22 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And I do understand
- 23 that and certainly understand that in the context of the
- 24 language. But let me turn the coin over that I was

Page 28 discussing with you just a moment ago. What right does the Class counsel have in 2 3 terms of -- and I guess it has to be against the backdrop of the retainer agreement, of the retention agreement -- what right does a Class counsel have to say, You know what, I can't deal with you people anymore; I am out of here? How does that work? 7 MR. LANDAU: Your Honor, the initial matter, Your Honor, I don't think that that is something that would be a concern for a few different reasons. 10 11 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Do you agree with me that a Class -- Class counsel can advise the Court 12 that it would no longer like to represent the Class? 13 14 And, quite frankly, I haven't looked at cases and it's not discussed in this fashion in your submittals, I am 15 not directed to any language in the Rule, nor do I see 16 17 any language in the Rule that locks Class counsel in if he or she or the firms want to be out. 18 MR. LANDAU: And, Your Honor, I don't see 19 anything specifically in the Rule about that either, but 20 I think it's worth noting that when an attorney seeks 21 22 the Court's appointment as Class counsel, they are taking on an obligation not just to their client and to 23 the Class but to the Court as well.

24

- 1 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Certainly.
- 2 MR. LANDAU: And, certainly, there couldn't
- 3 be any withdrawal of the type you mentioned without
- 4 permission of the Court.
- 5 In addition, it's hard to see why --
- 6 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Was that changed by
- 7 the Rule, do you expect?
- 8 MR. LANDAU: No. I don't expect that that
- 9 would be changed by the Rule. I think that, again, the
- 10 Rule clarifies the issue and makes clear what the
- 11 obligations and responsibilities of Class counsel are,
- 12 but I think that that was something that was an
- 13 obligation of Class counsel before.
- One of the things that's new, I think, is
- 15 that you wouldn't have a situation, in my view, where
- 16 Class counsel decided to seek leave to no longer serve
- in that role as a result of a disagreement or difference
- 18 of opinion with one of the Class representatives because
- 19 I think that the Rule now makes clear that the
- 20 responsibility of Class counsel is not just to their
- 21 individual client but to the Class as a whole. And to
- 22 the extent that was unclear before, then it's certainly
- 23 clear now.
- 24 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Well, I guess my

Page 30 questions are really framed against what Judge Farnan 7 was concerned about, and I think what I am hearing is that the circumstance of his concern isn't necessarily changed by a Rule, by this Rule, is it? 5 MR. LANDAU: I think it is, actually, Your Honor, because the concern that Judge Farnan expressed 6 was coercion. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: MR. LANDAU: And under the new Rules, the 10 coercion that's important isn't coercion of a Class representative, it's coercion of the Class as a whole 11 because the responsibilities of Class counsel are to the 12 13 Class as a whole. So there wouldn't be any occasion to exert any sort of coercion on a Class representative 14 15 because of what the Rule spells out as the obligations 16 of Class counsel. What's important is relationship between 17 Class counsel and the Class, and, as to that, I think 18 19 the Rule is clear that Class counsel is appointed to act 20 in the best interests of the Class. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I am not sure, 21 22 though, I understand your response in light of the language that Judge Farnan uses at page 509. It says, 23 "At a minimum, a Court must be satisfied that a 24

- 1 plaintiffs' resources are sufficient to preclude the
- 2 possibility that a plaintiff could be coerced into
- 3 complying with an attorney's advice with regard to
- 4 different options that may be available on legal issues
- 5 in Class action because of the potential threat of
- 6 funding revocation."
- Now, it may be that the Class counsel has to
- 8 jump through a different hoop. It may be that there has
- 9 to be a more detailed explanation to the Court, and I am
- 10 not sure that Judge Farnan was focused on, if you will,
- 11 any breach of the funding arrangement. I think he was
- 12 focused on just the concern that, at a point in time, if
- 13 Class counsel is in a position to force, whether it's by
- 14 leave of Court, if you will, or by virtue of the
- 15 agreement that you have, that's the concern that I see
- 16 him raising here. I don't have the context because we
- 17 don't have any facts in ML Lee.
- Do you see that differently?
- MR. LANDAU: I think that there are at least
- 20 two issues. One is, in light of the amendments to the
- 21 Rule, there still exists the opportunity for coercion
- 22 that Judge Farnan was concerned about. And the other
- 23 is: Is there any real threat here of funding revocation
- 24 that could be coercive? And, so far, we have been

Page 32 talking about that first issue: Is there an opportunity for coercion? And, again, I would go back to the example that the advisory committee gives, which I think would fit into Judge Farnan's concern about whether a plaintiff would comply with an attorney's advice. If an attorney had particular advice to give about a proposed settlement, then I read ML Lee to reflect a concern on Judge Farnan's part that a plaintiff could be coerced into accepting or rejecting a Class settlement through 10 the potential threat of funding revocation. But I think that what the amended Rule makes clear is that there is 11 no opportunity for coercion there because the Class 12 13 representatives cannot command Class counsel to accept 14 or reject a settlement proposal. 15 So, Class counsel wouldn't need to exert any coercion on a Class plaintiff. Instead, after 16 consulting with the Class representative, it would be 17 Class counsel's responsibility to determine whether 18 19 seeking the Court's approval of the settlement would be 20 in the best interests of the Class as a whole. 21 But to the extent --22 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And if there is a disagreement that is substantial enough, there could be 23 24 a circumstance where Class counsel is no longer in the

- 1 case. The Class isn't going to go away; fair statement?
- 2 MR. LANDAU: No. The Class wouldn't go
- 3 away, but I am not sure I see why Class counsel would go
- 4 away either because that obligation transcends an
- 5 individual client relationship.
- 6 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Do you agree with
- 7 me that if the Class counsel took a position that was
- 8 diametrically opposed to what the Class wanted to do,
- 9 and if that issue were served up, in whatever fashion to
- 10 the Court, because you are writing on a little bit of a
- 11 slate that doesn't exist here, and I don't know what
- 12 determination the Court would make other than a
- 13 determination that the views are so divergent, it may be
- 14 in the interest of the Class to have new counsel.
- I mean, I don't -- do you see the Court
- 16 literally getting involved in making a judgment that a
- 17 divergent view, in terms of path forward, the Court is
- 18 going to weigh in on that judgment and say, Class, you
- 19 got to go to the way counsel says or -- do you see the
- 20 Court doing that by virtue of this Rule change?
- MR. LANDAU: Well, for one thing, I don't
- 22 think it's a scenario that's very likely to occur in a
- 23 lot of circumstances.
- 24 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: All right. Well,

Page 34 and I understand your comment there. 1 2 MR. LANDAU: But I do think that, in the context of Class action settlements that have been proposed in various cases, it's not unknown for there to be Class members, whether named plaintiffs or not, who raise an objection to a particular settlement, and in 6 those cases, it's certainly the practice of the Court to 7 consider those objections and Rule on whether -- on what 8 result is in the best interest of the Class. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I understand that 10 and I understand the comment is also in the context of 11 settlement and not in the context of litigation 12 decisions, if you will. I mean, I do understand that. 13 Let me get, though, to another -- to the 14 financial issue here. Expecting that you have in place 15 16 a fee, of the most reasonable fees, the best example of a financial arrangement that could ever be written, is 17 it fair to say that, in the context of the Class losing 18 19 the case, and absent any other information with respect to how the Class would satisfy the potential obligation 20 to assume the costs as contemplated by our Local Rule, 21 and certainly the Federal Rule that it stems from, 22 assumes the cost of the defense, the Court should not be 23 concerned about that at all in performing its obligation 24

- 1 to make a determination about whether the Class -- the
- 2 representative parties will fairly and adequately
- 3 protect the interests of the Class?
- 4 MR. LANDAU: Initially, Your Honor, I would
- 5 say that there are a couple different types of expenses,
- 6 potentially. One is the type of expense that is
- 7 incurred by the Class representatives and Class counsel
- 8 as the case goes forward; for example, what Judge Farnan
- 9 mentioned about giving Class notice in the ML Lee case.
- 10 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right.
- MR. LANDAU: And the separate kind of cost,
- 12 which is the one, I believe, that you mentioned with
- 13 respect to the Local Rule and costs at the conclusion of
- 14 the case. But let me say, first, I am not aware of any
- 15 circumstances, necessarily, where it would be the
- 16 obligation of the client to pay those costs.
- 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Who pays them?
- MR. LANDAU: I think, under the terms of our
- 19 representations to the Court and our agreements with our
- 20 clients, it's our responsibility to advance the costs of
- 21 litigation, and those costs would be -- the payment of
- 22 those costs would be contingent on the outcome of the
- 23 case.
- 24 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: How does that

Page 36 answer the question that I posed? Namely, the question: If the Class loses and Intel makes a timely application, under the Rule, for assessment of costs, and they win, who pays those costs? 4 MR. LANDAU: I think, Your Honor, that it would be Class counsel that paid those costs. I am not 6 aware of why that wouldn't be true. Intel has cited this Oklahoma Bar Association opinion, but a few things .8 are worth noting about that. One is that it's not 10 final. Another is that it's not binding even in 11 Oklahoma. 12 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right. 13 MR. LANDAU: Another is that it's not about Class actions, specifically, it's about indemnification 14 15 for attorneys' fees, principally, and, even as that 16 opinion acknowledges, it's in conflict with an opinion 17 of at least one other State Bar Association. But I think that regardless of who is responsible for those 18 sorts of costs, and I am not persuaded by the citation 19 of that opinion that it has to be the client who is, 20 those are not costs, in my view, that have anything to 21 22 do with the Class representative's responsibilities to 23 the litigation on behalf of absent Class members in the

same way that giving notice to the Class could be

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- 1 because, there, we have --
- 2 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Let me stop you
- 3 there for a moment. Why wouldn't that be a concern in
- 4 terms of -- the structure, for better for worse, the way
- 5 it's built, says that an individual plaintiff and an
- 6 individual -- individual plaintiff against individual
- 7 defendant, a defendant prevails, in that circumstance,
- 8 the defendant has, absent any other statute that would
- 9 preclude that, an opportunity under the Federal Rules,
- 10 and under the Local Rules here in Delaware, to ask for
- 11 costs; correct?
- MR. LANDAU: Correct.
- 13 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And let me just
- 14 take one step further. And in a Class circumstance
- 15 where the costs can be extraordinarily substantial and
- 16 much more substantial than the individual plaintiff
- 17 against an individual defendant, are you suggesting that
- 18 the Court should not have any concern whatsoever about
- 19 the wherewithal of the Class to shoulder any and all
- 20 obligation that may result from bringing that Class
- 21 action, one of those being, if you lose, you are going
- 22 to pay costs, and if I order costs and you don't pay
- 23 costs, aren't there court-related results that flow from
- 24 that directed to any of the individual representatives

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     of the Class?
                 MR. LANDAU: There may be, but I don't think
     that those are in their capacity as Class
     representatives so much as they are in their capacity as
     plaintiffs who brought the litigation. In other words,
     it doesn't affect their ability to represent absent
     Class members.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay.
                 MR. LANDAU: It may if we assume that it
     would be the client and not Class counsel who would
10
     ultimately be liable for those costs result in some
11
     later separate proceedings to collect those costs, but
12
     one of the things, for example, that the Tenth Circuit
13
     observed in the Sanderson opinion was that it wrote,
14
15
     "Nor do we see that the defendants have any legitimate
16
     concern as to whether plaintiffs will be able to pay
     their lawyers and will be able to pay a judgment for
17
     costs in the event that such a judgment is entered."
18
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I am aware of that
19
     language. Let me ask you -- I think I understand your
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21
     response with respect to the obligation of the Class
     once this lawsuit is over, I think, but I have some more
22
23
     specific questions with respect to that.
                 Do I understand you, then, to say that, with
24
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- 1 respect to Rule 23(a)(4), that the Class plaintiffs'
- 2 financial information is not a relevant consideration
- 3 ever at all?
- 4 MR. LANDAU: In determining whether to grant
- 5 Class certification, Your Honor?
- 6 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes.
- 7 MR. LANDAU: I think that that's our
- 8 position, that the financial position of a Class
- 9 representative is not relevant to the process of Class
- 10 determination under the amended 2003 Federal Rule.
- 11 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: So, 23(g), from
- 12 your point of view, trumps 23(a)(4)?
- 13 MR. LANDAU: I quess I would say that, to
- 14 the extent that 23(a)(4) could have been interpreted
- 15 previously because it was silent on this precise issue,
- 16 could have been interpreted to impose that obligation on
- 17 the Class representatives or to make that relevant, the
- amendments to Rule 23(q) clarify that the financial
- 19 resources that are relevant in this process are the
- 20 resources of Class counsel. And, in fact, in the text
- 21 of Rule 23(g), itself, one of the qualifications for
- 22 Class counsel, under 23(g)(1)(b)(1), are the resources
- 23 that counsel will commit to representing the Class.
- 24 It's the final bullet point in that subsection.

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                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes, I am aware of
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 2
     that. So, I gather you may be suggesting that the
     financial resources of counsel, itself, may be subject
 3
     to some inquiry on behalf of the Court?
                 MR. LANDAU: Well, I think that we had that
 5
     already, Your Honor, when interim Class counsel here
 6
 7
     submitted their application to be appointed by the
 8
     Court, and in that application, we represented that we
     were willing and able to deploy the necessary resources
     to litigate these actions zealously and effectively, and
10
     the Court accepted that application.
11
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes. Help me with
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13
     it, please, because all I had available to me, when I
     looked at those documents, was that document, itself,
14
     and I did not know whether there were any documents that
15
     were requested by the Court in addition to what you
16
     filed or whether there was anymore detail other than
17
     what I see on the Docket.
18
                 MR. LANDAU: I believe, Your Honor, that
19
     there was the mission that may have been made under seal
20
     with respect to how we would propose to handle any fee
21
22
     request, but I don't believe that that included
23
     information about our financial resources.
24
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And I was aware of
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Page 41 the application for fee request being made under seal. 1 2 MR. LANDAU: Other than that, I don't think 3 that there were any other papers submitted, Your Honor. 4 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Then I guess one final question: You see Rule 1.8(b)(1), "A lawyer shall 5 6 not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with the pending or contemplated litigation 7 except that a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be 10 contingent on the outcome of the matter," you read that 11 to mean that if the Class loses and Intel makes an 12 application for costs and the Court awards costs, that there is no prohibition, under Rule 1.8, from counsel 13 14 assuming those costs; is that the way you read that? 15 MR. LANDAU: That is the way that I read 16 that, Your Honor. 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okav. MR. LANDAU: If I can point out one other 18 19 Intel's counsel referred to the Mascol case as

21 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes.

20

MR. LANDAU: My reading of that case is not

being one decided after the Rule amendments.

- 23 necessarily inconsistent with what we are arguing here.
- 24 All the Court in Mascol suggested was that other courts

Page 42 had found the Class representatives' financial resources to be a relevant factor in determining adequacy, 2 although that particular Court goes on to distinguish 3 those cases, note that plaintiffs' counsel are offering 5 their services in the hopes of recovering costs and attorneys' fees from the defendants and concluded that 6 the Court is satisfied that the financial resource of 7 the plaintiffs will not affect the adequacy of representation. 9 10 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: You would agree 11 with me that that is a merits decision and it was not 12 talking, I think I am correct, just thumbing through it 13 now again, that was not a, in the discovery stage, if 14 you will? MR. LANDAU: That's right. It wasn't in the 15 discovery stage, but it does, I think, indicate that the 16 type of discovery being sought here isn't relevant to 17 18 that ultimate decision, but, at the very least, I 19 pointed out, because that's the only reference that I 20 have seen so far by Intel to a post 2003 opinion on this issue, and I don't think that it supports their 21 22 argument.

- 23 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you.
- 24 Anything else from the Class, please?

- 1 MR. LANDAU: Unless Your Honor has other
- 2 questions, then I don't think I have anything further.
- 3 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Thank you.
- 4 From Intel, please.
- 5 MR. HOCKETT: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
- 6 This is Chris Hockett again.
- 7 I think that the plaintiffs' interpretation
- 8 of Rule 23(g) is exactly wrong, and I think it may even
- 9 heighten the concern about coercion.
- 10 23(g) leaves intact the obligation of the
- 11 Class representative to do his or her thing and look out
- 12 for the interests of the Class and does not give the
- 13 Class counsel a trump card that allows it to coerce,
- 14 without consequence, individual Class representatives
- 15 because they claim it's in the interests of the Class.
- I think both, after 23(g), both Class
- 17 counsel and Class representatives are supposed to be
- 18 looking out for the interests of the Class, and,
- 19 therefore, preventing Class representatives from
- 20 coercion is just as important now as it always has been,
- 21 indeed, maybe more so if 23(g) makes Class counsel think
- 22 that they can call the shots.
- 23 If that's what 23(g) meant, then you
- 24 wouldn't need Class representatives, you wouldn't need

Page 44 any clients at all, but they are there for a reason and they are still occurred by Rule 23(a)(4), and we would argue that they need to be protected in exactly the same 3 way as Judge Farnan expressed in his opinion in ML Lee. With regard to the sensitivity of the information, we certainly acknowledge that it is 6 sensitive. I would point out that, as is typical in 7 cases of this kind, the defendants produce millions of 8. pages of highly sensitive information and that's why we 9 have a protective order, and, of course, anything that 10 the plaintiffs produce here would be covered by it. 11 And I think that's all I have to say. 12 13 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. 14 MR. LANDAU: Your Honor, may I briefly 15 respond to that? SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Sure. 16 MR. LANDAU: I didn't mean to suggest, and I 17 don't think that I did, that Class counsel would have a 18 trump card that would allow them to coerce the Class 19 representatives without consequence. 2.0 I think, Your Honor, as you pointed out and 21 as you and I discussed, everything that Class counsel 22 does is subject to the oversight of the Court and there 23 are various mechanisms in place to ensure that. 24

- I think, as I mentioned, that it's a little
- 2 bit of a farfetched scenario to think that this is going
- 3 to be something that comes up with any frequency. I
- 4 think it's extremely unlikely that there would be a
- 5 divergence of views or that there would be any
- 6 opportunity for this sort of situation.
- 7 What I did mean to suggest is that Rule
- 8 23(q) establishes that the relationship between Class
- 9 counsel and Class representative is not an ordinary
- 10 attorney/client relationship. Class counsel has broader
- 11 responsibilities that derive from its appointment to
- 12 that role by the Court that require it to act on behalf
- 13 of all Class members. And to the extent that a
- 14 particular client has a view that is not in the best
- 15 interests of the Class, it would not be appropriate for
- 16 the -- for Class counsel to simply follow that client's
- 17 orders because Class counsel has an obligation to the
- 18 Class as a whole.
- 19 Class representatives are certainly
- 20 important in the process, they are critical, in fact,
- 21 and I would think that any significant decision that
- 22 Class counsel was making, they would make in
- 23 consultation with the Class representatives just as you
- 24 would have in any sort of litigation. But Class actions

- 1 are not the same as ordinary litigation because of the
- 2 presence of absent Class members and the special role of
- 3 the Court. And, so, I think that what Rule 23(g) is
- 4 doing is addressing and clarifying this rather unique
- 5 situation of how Class counsel is to act. But how it
- 6 relates to the ML Lee decision and the issue we have
- 7 been discussing is, in my view, you know, eliminates any
- 8 opportunity for coercion of a named Class representative
- 9 by Class counsel in light of the Rule.
- The only other thing I would add would be,
- 11 with respect to the production of documents, it's
- 12 certainly true that the defendants have produced
- 13 documents; the plaintiffs have as well. What they have
- 14 in common is that all of those documents are relevant to
- 15 the subject matter of the case.
- 16 What we are talking about here is personal
- 17 financial information of the plaintiffs that isn't going
- 18 to be relevant, in light of 2003 Rule amendments, to the
- 19 Class certification decision, and that, as such, there
- 20 is no reason, and, in fact, it would be improper for the
- 21 plaintiffs to have to produce that information here.
- 22 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Thank you.
- 23 Just give me a few moments here. I am going to put you
- 24 on hold, so if all need to be talking about anything,

- 1 you can do that. And I shouldn't be but just a couple,
- 2 two or three minutes.
- 3 MR. HOCKETT: Judge Poppiti, if I can say
- 4 one last thing? Are you still there?
- 5 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes. Thank you.
- 6 MR. HOCKETT: Thank you. I just wanted to
- 7 let you know a timing issue, and this isn't your
- 8 problem, it's really ours, we are starting -- Class
- 9 representative depositions are scheduled to start on
- 10 Friday, so I just wanted to let you know that,
- 11 obviously, we are -- we would like to have an answer to
- 12 the -- this question so as to avoid --
- 13 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Here is what I
- 14 intend to do: I intend to tell you what my view of it
- 15 is today, and I think the most efficient way -- because
- 16 I expected that there was an immediate need, if you
- 17 will, and, yet, I expect that if there is also a need to
- 18 take whatever I do up to Judge Farnan, it may be
- 19 important to have, in addition to the transcript, a
- 20 document.
- 21 Rather than putting that document on my desk
- 22 for purposes of moving it through, I am going to ask the
- 23 prevailing party to prepare what I would call the form
- 24 of order, the proposed findings and conclusions and

Page 48 recommendations consistent with the way that I have done it in Intel and other cases in the more abbreviated fashion, so that it would be prepared by the prevailing party, approved only as to form, I will give you some time frames on that, so that you have got a document to 5 take to Judge Farnan if there is a decision made by the 6 7 party that does not prevail to do that. Okay? 8 MR. HOCKETT: Thank you. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I just need a few 10 moments. MR. LANDAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Counsel, we are 12 back on. Rather than getting into a long recitation of 13 14 some of my reasons here, I do want to certainly touch on some things that we did discuss, and, at the same time, 15 suggest, for purposes of creating a document for my view 16 that my questions, I think, will -- some of my questions 17 frame part of my reasons for granting the application. 18 I don't think there is any dispute that Rule 19 23(a)(4), as it existed prior to the amendment, which 20 21 has remained unchanged since the amendment, puts the representative plaintiffs' financial capacity at issue 22 in this jurisdiction, particularly given the facts of 23 this case where there is a substantial Class with an 24

- 1 expectation of substantial costs going forward. And I
- 2 think that the rationale, of course, is laid out in
- 3 ML Lee.
- I have no specific information regarding the
- 5 fee arrangement that counsel, Class counsel has said
- 6 that it has with the Class. I understand that there is
- 7 an arrangement where costs and expenses of litigation
- 8 are being paid in advance, as you go.
- 9 I think I also understand, and, please,
- 10 somebody, if Class could correct me if I am wrong, that
- 11 the nature of the obligation is almost couched in terms
- 12 of the way the Rule is couched, and, that is, the costs
- 13 and expenses of litigation are advanced, the repayment
- 14 of which is contingent on the outcome of the matter, and
- 15 I don't think I heard anymore detail other than that.
- It seems to me that, notwithstanding the one
- 17 case that counsel referenced, that where there is an
- 18 opportunity in any litigation for the prevailing
- 19 defendant to apply to the Court for costs and fees --
- 20 for costs, I am sorry, not fees, that the Court
- 21 appropriately can entertain issues with respect to
- 22 whether the Class is able to satisfy any and all
- 23 obligations as it relates to the prosecution of the
- 24 lawsuit.

Page 50 1 Having no more information about the fee arrangement, I don't think it's important for me to discuss whether it does or whether it doesn't comply with model Rule 1.8(b) I am mindful of the fact that, at the time that Judge Farnan issued his decision, there were cases 6 that the financial capacity of the plaintiffs were relevant, was relevant, and the financial capacity of 8 the plaintiffs were not relevant. I expect that those cases that went before that said the financial capacity 10 was not an issue, was not relevant, although Judge 11 Farnan didn't discuss all of those cases, I would expect 12 that anything that went before is simply subsumed in a 13 decision that went the other way. 14 15 In fact, a number of those cases, whether 16 they were before the Judge Farnan decision or after the Farnan decision, I believe are very fact-driven. 17 seems to me that a number of the cases focus on the size 18 of the Class. Others of the cases focus rather 19 specifically on the financial arrangements that were 20 made in the case, and I think I spoke with you in a 21 little bit of detail about what was said in Weikel where 22 there was not only an arrangement with Class counsel but 23 there was also an arrangement with an individual -- with 24

- 1 respect to one individual member of the Class with
- 2 another member by the name of Workman, and Workman was
- 3 willing to pay even if the Class lost. So, it's, in my
- 4 view, fact intensive.
- 5 The question, then, is whether the changes
- 6 to the Rule should result in some different approach in
- 7 this jurisdiction, and I am not satisfied that the
- 8 changes to the Rule literally swallow the requirements
- 9 of 23(a)(4).
- I understand that the responsibility of
- 11 Class plaintiffs' counsel is described in detail. I
- 12 also understand that, based on the comments to the Rule,
- 13 not an insignificant amount of that penned detail in the
- 14 new Rule was detail that the Court was focused on in any
- 15 event, whether it was leading up to the consideration of
- 16 Class counsel, whether it was during the consideration
- 17 of the actual appointment, and even in terms of the
- 18 appointment procedures, themselves. Based on my
- 19 understanding of the comments in the rules, I understand
- 20 that these, in a sense, were a codification of practice.
- 21 I do not believe that the Rule obviates
- 22 Judge Farnan's concern that there could be coercion even
- 23 if the coercion is something that would be unusual. I
- 24 don't have any sense from the ML Lee case that Judge

Page 52 1 Farnan was faced with a circumstance where he had a very 2 specific focus regarding coercion and withdrawal of 3 funding. I don't see that in his case. It may not be 4 present here. In any event, he still considered that 5 concern and ruled as he did. 6 For those reasons, I will grant the 7 application. I would ask Intel to prepare the form of 8 order, for the Class to approve it as to form only, and

11 And, please, I don't think it -- it goes

I'd like you to make some suggestion with respect to the

- 12 without saying that what I am not going to be looking
- 13 for is a document that argues the position. You have
- 14 done that in your papers. It's a matter of, perhaps,
- 15 just changing the papers to look more like the form of
- 16 document that I am contemplating and not the letter
- 17 arguments that were advanced.

timing of that, please.

9

10

- 18 MR. HOCKETT: Thank you. We understand, I
- 19 think, what you are looking for. May I ask a question?
- 20 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Please.
- MR. HOCKETT: When would we expect a
- 22 transcript of this hearing?
- 23 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: If I know my friend
- 24 on the phone, you are probably going to get it first

- 1 thing in the morning if not sooner.
- 2 MR. HOCKETT: I think we could probably get
- 3 something to the plaintiffs by tomorrow night.
- 4 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. If the Class
- 5 gets it tomorrow night, what can the turnaround time be.
- 6 MR. HOLZMAN: Tomorrow night California
- 7 time?
- 8 MR. HOCKETT: It will probably be tomorrow
- 9 afternoon California time, evening East Coast time.
- 10 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: If we are going to
- 11 do time like that, then let's just use East Coast time
- 12 for purposes of either setting a specific hour deadline
- 13 or at least some parameters, please. That may be
- 14 helpful for everyone.
- 15 MR. LANDAU: I think that if we receive
- 16 Intel's form of order by 5:00 p.m. East Coast time
- 17 tomorrow, that we could have something back to them by
- 18 5:00 p.m. East Coast time on Friday.
- 19 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay.
- MR. HOCKETT: We would, because of the time
- 21 difference, we would ask that we get it to you by 8:00
- 22 East Coast time tomorrow night, just so that we have the
- 23 day to create the thing. I think it should take longer
- 24 for us to create it than it should take for you to

Page 54 provide comments on it. 1 MR. LANDAU: That would be fine, Your Honor. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Then when, after you all do that, when do you expect I should be able to 5 see it on my desk? MR. HOCKETT: Well, I guess we will need to 6 try to resolve any issues that we have --8 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Correct. 9 MR. HOCKETT: -- sometime, it sounds like it will be sometime on Monday because -- or over the 10 weekend because the -- we won't receive plaintiffs' 11 comments until the end of the day on Friday. 12 MR. LANDAU: If we are receiving it by 5:00 13 p.m. East Coast time, then, obviously, we have some 14 15 extra time here on the West Coast to deal with you 16 Friday afternoon if you are open to that. MR. HOCKETT: I am sure that we can be 17 18 available. MR. LANDAU: Why don't we commit to get 19 something to you, Judge Poppiti, by close of business 20 East Coast time on Monday. 21 22 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. 23 MR. LANDAU: That sets out where we stand. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: All right. 24

MR. HOCKETT: And I hope --1 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Let me ask this: 2 What I'd like to be in a position to do is -- I don't 3 anticipate that I am going to have to spend a 4 significant amount of time with it. If there are 5 disputes with respect to the form of the order, is it 6 your expectation that I should simply deal with those or 7 would you want to be having a conversation with me? 8 MR. HOCKETT: What I was anticipating would 9 10 be most convenient for you would be for us to provide 11 competing versions of any sections in controversy. 12 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. MR. HOCKETT: And then you could choose one 13 14 of those or adapt; is that correct? SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: That would be the 15 16 way to do it, and if you are saying end of business on 17 Monday -- I am hoping I can get it out next day, but I have an all day matter that I have to -- I have got an 18 all day mediation, so let me say I will try, by the end 19 of the business -- end of business on the 28th or no 2.0 21 later than noon on the 29th. 22 MR. HOCKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And if you come up with any other arrangement to do it sooner, then simply 24

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     let me know what that is and I will adjust my commitment
     to everyone accordingly.
                 MR. HOCKETT: Appreciate that. We will see
 3
     if we can do it sooner because I think it's in both
     side's interest to get this finalized.
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I agree. Any other
 6
 7
     matters, then, please?
                 MR. HOLZMAN: I request permission to talk
 8
     past you, if I might, only to ask Renee for her e-mail
10
     address. I think that would help everything.
                 COURT REPORTER: It's
11
     reneemeyers1@comcast.net.
12
13
                 MR. HOLZMAN: That's all I have. Thank you
     for the courtesy. I appreciate it.
14
                 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Not at all. Thank
15
16
     you all.
17
                 (The hearing was concluded at 5:32 p.m.)
18
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20
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24
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1	CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF DELAWARE:
3	NEW CASTLE COUNTY:
4	I, Renee A. Meyers, a Registered Professional
5	Reporter, within and for the County and State aforesaid,
6	do hereby certify that the foregoing teleconference was
7	taken before me, pursuant to notice, at the time and
8	place indicated; that the teleconference was correctly
9	recorded in machine shorthand by me and thereafter
10	transcribed under my supervision with computer-aided
11	transcription; that the foregoing teleconference is a
12	true record; and that I am neither of counsel nor kin to
13	any party in said action, nor interested in the outcome
14	thereof.
15	WITNESS my hand this 23rd day of August A.D.
16	2007.
17	
18	Paris a henres
19	RENEE A. MEYERS REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER
20	CERTIFICATION NO. 106-RPR (Expires January 31, 2008)
21	(Expires valually 31, 2000)
22	
23	
24	